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 COMMENT 
Are My Cornrows Unprofessional?: 
Title VII’s Narrow Application of 
Grooming Policies, and its Effect on 
Black Women’s Natural Hair in the 
Workplace 
By Renee Henson* 
ABSTRACT 
Employer grooming policies are ubiquitous and apply to all in the work-
place, however, the hair standards within these policies do not permit 
women to wear a myriad of ethnic hairstyles at work. Banning ethnic hair-
styles like braids, cornrows, and dreadlocks adversely and disproportion-
ally affects black women. Banning ethnic styles because they are deemed 
unprofessional forces many black women to spend inordinate amounts of 
money and time to ensure their hair is “professional looking enough” to 
attain gainful employment and climb the corporate ladder. This article ex-
amines Title VII’s role in allowing this practice where black women are 
not permitted to wear their hair in styles that are often the most healthy and 
natural for their hair, and the legal freedom employers have to fire employ-
ees for wearing dreadlocks, braids and twists with impunity. This article 
proposes several ways that Title VII’s application to black hair texture and 
hairstyles could be improved. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are desperately in need of a job. Imagine, in addition to writing a top-notch 
resume, making sure your LinkedIn account is current, searching exhaustively for 
your future job, ensuring you are qualified for that job, filling out an application, 
and receiving a call to interview—you also need to ensure that your hair is “done” 
and professional looking enough so that you actually have a chance at getting the 
job. It goes without saying that the need to look professional at any job interview is 
important, irrespective of gender, and race—however ensuring that one’s hair is 
“done” has a deleterious meaning for black women. 
“Done” means not having a large afro, not having cornrows,1 not having braids, 
not having twists, not having dreadlocks, all hairstyles that are equated with an “un-
professional” look.2 “Done” means there must be a considerable amount of time put 
into hairstyling to ensure that your hair is straightened, weaved,3 or tied down into 
a bun as best as you can manage.4 “Done” means that attaining a desired look will 
cost you, in many cases, hundreds of dollars, and hours at a salon.5 “Done” means 
that you must not exercise, or expose your hair to water of any kind.6 And this is 
not only a concern for the job interview itself; the next question a black woman 
must ask herself is the following: if she gets the job, must she maintain this look 
day after day, lest she open herself to risk of non-advancement, or loss of her job? 
A black woman does not have the freedom to wear her hair in a large afro, 
cornrows, or many other ethnic hairstyles at work, which can be the easiest, health-
iest, and most natural way that she could wear her hair.7 It is legally permissible to 
institute grooming policies that do not violate Title VII’s provisions in order for 
employers to regulate appearance in the workplace.8 Grooming policies act as a 
minimum threshold of what employers contend are acceptable forms of appearance 
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 1. “Cornrows,” for the purposes of this article, are a traditionally African hairstyle that black Amer-
ican women have worn from the days of slavery and into the present. The Cornrow style is when the hair 
is platted to the scalp. The plats are braids that can extend down from a woman’s head to be worn down 
or in a ponytail. Cornrows are becoming more mainstream with stars like Kim Kardashian, Beyoncé, 
and Rihanna wearing them. 
 2. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title 
VII, 98 GEO. L. J. 1079, 1097 (2010). 
 3. “Weaves,” for the purposes of this article, refer to hair extensions that are commonly sewn into 
the hair. The hair weft is sewn onto a braided plait of a person’s scalp. Weaves can take many hours to 
complete, and may fully encompass a women’s head adding additional length, volume, and often uses a 
completely different texture than what is naturally grown on the head. 
 4. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 5. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2, at 1115. 
 6. Raechele Cochran Gathers et al., African American Women, Hair Care, and Barriers, 7(9) THE J. 
OF CLINICAL & AESTHETIC DERMATOLOGY 26 (2014). 
 7. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232 (noting that the term “natural,” means a black woman’s hair that is 
not chemically straightened, and is otherwise unprocessed. Natural hair refers to the curly and kinky 
textures that are genetically inherent in black men and women). 
 8. Id. at 233-34. 
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at work.9 In the seminal case on the issue of black women’s hair in the workplace, 
Rogers v. American Airlines, the court dismissed Renee Roger’s argument that she 
should be able to wear cornrows at work based on the hairstyle’s historical and 
cultural significance to black American women.10 American Airlines argued suc-
cessfully that standards banning cornrows should not be considered race discrimi-
nation under Title VII because braids are an “easily changed characteristic,” not tied 
to a specific race, and thus, employers should be free to penalize employees on the 
basis of wearing braids in the workplace.11 
Courts have concluded that black women’s hairstyle restrictions in the work-
place are not based on immutable characteristics, such as race or sex, and as such 
do not violate Title VII.12 Title VII allows for recovery based on employment dis-
crimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”13 Black 
women have not been able to successfully litigate having the freedom to wear their 
hair in ethnic and other natural hairstyles because they have not been able to pene-
trate the barrier that hair is not sufficiently tied to race or sex discrimination under 
Title VII.14 
In Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 
Angela Onwauachi-Willig says that Renee failed to win her case because she did 
not stack allegations of race and sex discrimination under Title VII; instead, she 
mainly argued that cornrow braids should be protected as tied to race because they 
are an outgrowth of black American history.15 Onwauachi-Willig says that Renee 
lost out on arguing the unique experience of discrimination by being both black and 
a woman.16 Part II will discuss why not allowing for certain hairstyles within the 
workplace is a problem, and remains such a burden on black women in particular. 
Part III will discuss possible solutions to this problem, and will explore reasons 
why courts should expand their interpretation of “immutable characteristics,” which 
has become one of the main bases for courts’ rejection of plaintiffs’ claims on this 
issue—arguing that hair is mutable, and thus, should not be protected under Title 
VII for race discrimination.17 This part will also explain how banning ethnic hair-
styles from the workplace is a sex based form of discrimination, that tends to dis-
parately impact black women over white women.18 Further, part III will explore 
how courts too narrowly interpret national origin as under Title VII, and how a 
broader interpretation could affect change on the issue of black women’s hair in the 
workplace for the better.19 Lastly, this part will discuss how black women not only 
face unique discrimination based on race and sex for their hair, but also on the 
                                                          
 9. Emily Jane Perkins, Regulating Appearance In The Workplace: An Employer’s Guide To Avoid 
Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, THE NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.natlawre-
view.com/article/regulating-appearance-workplace-employer-s-guide-to-avoid-employment-discrimi-
nation-. 
 10. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233-34. 
 11. Id. at 232. 
 12. See 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (2012). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2, at 1092. 
 15. Id. at 1091-92. 
 16. Id. at 1092. 
 17. E.E.O.C. v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (S.D. Ala. 2014), aff’d, 837 F.3d 1156 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
 18. See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2. 
 19. Juan Perea, Ethnicity And Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title 
VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 807 (1994). 
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intersectionality of national origin, and that the freedom of black women to wear 
their hair in ethnic hairstyles could alternatively lie in the tripartite force of the ex-
tremely unique position of facing discrimination based on race, sex, and national 
origin. 
II.  GETTING TO THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM 
It is time for parents to teach young people early on that in diversity there is 
beauty and there is strength. Maya Angelou.20 
A. Black Women Have Not Found Success in the Courtroom When 
Fighting Grooming Policies 
In EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Chastity Jones filed suit 
against Catastrophe Management Solutions (“CMS”) when the company offered 
her a job, but later, after realizing her hair was styled in dreadlocks, said that she 
would have to cut off all of her hair in order to retain employment with the com-
pany.21 Chastity did not agree to cut her hair and the job offer was rescinded.22 The 
court held in favor of CMS, saying that a hairstyle is not an immutable characteris-
tic, and thus, is not protected under Title VII.23 EEOC v. Catastrophe Management 
was recently upheld in the 11th Circuit.24 The 11th Circuit said that Title VII only 
protects people with respect to race based on immutable characteristics—character-
istics that cannot be changed, and not cultural practices.25 The 11th Circuit con-
cluded that a person’s hairstyle is a cultural practice, and as such is not protected 
under Title VII.26 
The 11th Circuit conceded in part by saying that there is a fine line of distinction 
between mutability and immutability, saying that “discrimination on the basis of 
black hair texture (an immutable characteristic) is prohibited by Title VII, while 
adverse action on the basis of black hairstyle (a mutable choice) is not.”27 The court 
insisted that the physical characteristics of black hair were somehow distinct from 
the style choices that are most appropriate based on those characteristics.28 Chastity 
argued, inter alia, that dreadlocks were an “outgrowth” of black culture, meaning 
that the texture of black hair lends itself to ethnic hairstyles.29 Blacks do not usually 
have the option of literally letting their hair down; instead, healthy maintenance of 
black hair requires some type of manipulation, and the most economical and lesser 
maintenance styles are dreadlocks, twists, and braids.30 EEOC v. Catastrophe Man-
agement is a clear showing that black women can face the choice of dramatically 
                                                          
 20. Maya Angelou, VOICES OF EDUC. http://voiceseducation.org/content/maya-angelou-0 (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2017). 
 21. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 11 F. Supp. 3d at 1140. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 1143. 
 24. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir. 2016). 
 25. Id. at 1167. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1168. 
 29. Id. at 1161. 
 30. Aline Tanus, et al., Black Women’s Hair: The Main Scalp Dermatoses and Aesthetic Practices In 
Women Of African Ethnicity, 90(4) ANAIS BRASILEIROS DE DERMATOLOGIA 450 (2015). 
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altering their hair to concede to the status quo of typically white hair normatives in 
America, or miss out on gainful employment due to their hair.31 
B. Black Women’s Hairstyle Restrictions in the Workplace Contrib-
ute to a Less Diverse Workforce 
There is a broader problem: many large companies are falling short in the di-
versity arena.32 Allowing black women to wear their hair in a natural way or in a 
myriad of ethnic hairstyles within the workplace would allow black women to have 
access to more jobs, and open the door for them to excel and climb the corporate 
ladder in ways that might be currently closed off.33 Large companies recognize that 
diversity in the workplace is a thing to be desired, but many large corporations are 
doing poorly as they try to increase diversity among their employees.34 The problem 
is at the top. According to Fortune, there have only been 15 black CEOs in the 
history of Fortune 500 companies.35 As of 2015, there were only five black CEOs 
in the biggest 500 companies, only one of whom is a woman; worse, the number of 
black CEOs is on the decline.36 
Blacks in corporate America face the challenge of balancing their images at 
work: they feel they must be “focused—but not too aggressive, hungry—but not 
threatening, talented—but not too talented.”37 Some blacks feel additional pressure 
is added when they are in a corporate setting due to being viewed as the sole repre-
sentative for all blacks, who are often viewed monolithically.38 Such pressures con-
tribute to black employees wanting to leave the corporate environment.39 A recent 
ABA article said that 85% of minority women attorneys will quit big law firms 
within seven years of starting.40 
There are many complex problems that lead to blacks not being equally repre-
sented in corporate America, but hair can certainly be one of the many pressures 
that especially black American women face, which compounds this problem.41 
Even if professional black women do not face outright bans on ethnic hairstyles, 
they must worry about taming their hair in order to have a “professional” look, while 
juggling other stressful pressures inherent in working in corporate America, as well 
as balancing additional pressures only faced by blacks.42 
                                                          
 31. See Tabora A. Johnson & Teiahsha Bankhead, Hair It Is: Examining the Experiences of Black 
Women with Natural Hair, 2 OPEN J. OF SOC. SCI. 86, 91 (2014). 
 32. Gregory Wallace, Only 5 Black CEO’s at 500 Biggest Companies, CNN MONEY (Jan. 29, 2015, 
2:11 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/29/news/economy/mcdonalds-ceo-diversity/. 
 33. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 837 F.3d at 1172. 
 34. Wallace, supra note 32. 
 35. Young, Black, and Left Out of Corporate America, Big Business has a Diversity Problem, 
FORTUNE, (Jan. 22, 2016), http://fortune.com/video/2016/01/22/leading-while-black/ [hereinafter 
FORTUNE]. 
 36. Wallace, supra note 32. 
 37. FORTUNE, supra note 35. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Wallace, supra note 32. 
 40. Liane Jackson, Minority Women are Disappearing from BigLaw—and Here’s Why, ABA J. 
(Mar. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/minority_women_are_disappear-
ing_from_biglaw_and_heres_why. 
 41. Johnson & Bankhead, supra note 31, at 91. 
 42. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2, at 1092. 
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C. Grooming Policies Are Ubiquitous and Very Burdensome on 
Black Women’s Hair and Health 
Grooming policies for companies are commonplace, and can be very restric-
tive.43 For example, Abercrombie, a teen retailer, was sued by Umme-Hani Khan, 
a store employee, based on its “Look Policy.”44 Umme-Hani argued that she was 
discriminated against for the hijab she wore on her head, and as a result, was fired.45 
The court held for Umme-Hani, finding that Abercrombie did not accommodate her 
deeply held religious beliefs that necessitated her wearing her hijab at all times, and 
that Abercrombie did not show that it was unduly burdened by her hijab.46 The court 
used a two-part test, where plaintiffs must show a prima facie need for accommo-
dation based on their religious practices, and if done successfully, the burden then 
shifts to the employer to show that it made a good faith effort to reasonably accom-
modate the person’s religious practices or that it could not make the necessary ac-
commodations due to an undue burden.47 Abercrombie was unable to show an un-
due burden.48 
Abercrombie has specifications in their look policy outlining standards ranging 
from permissible hairstyles to jewelry.49 Some of Abercrombie’s hairstyle standards 
specify that: 
hair color and highlights must appear natural. Highlights should be 
blended and there should be no streaks, blocks, or chunks of contrasting 
colors. Highlights should appear as if hair is naturally highlighted by the 
sun and not manipulated by unnatural bleaching methods . . . a clean, nat-
ural, classic hairstyle is acceptable for store employees . . . [n]o associate 
is permitted to wear any extreme hairstyles or hair color. Hairstyles and 
hair color should reflect your natural beauty.50 
United Airline’s flight attendant grooming standards specify that hair “[m]ust 
be clean, neatly trimmed, and conservatively styled . . . [c]olor must complement 
natural hair and skin tone and should be well maintained . . . [e]xtreme styles are 
not permitted.”51 
Ostensibly, these standards do not seem overly burdensome by using words 
like “natural” and “classic.”52 However, the above policies and the laws that permit 
them assume that all hair textures are one and the same. But for the reality of black 
                                                          
 43. See Sapna Maheshwari, Exclusive: The Hairstyles Abercrombie Has Deemed “Unacceptable”, 
BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:34 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/sapna/exclusive-abercrombie-
hairstyle-rules-add-to-strict-look-pol?utm_term=.pf2XL8N50#.qbGXbV7Ko. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Equal Emp’l Opportunity Comm’n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 949 
(N.D. Cal. 2013). 
 46. Id. at 965. 
 47. Id. at 961. 
 48. Id. at 962. 
 49. Maheshwari, supra note 43. 
 50. Id. 
 51. United Inflight Servs., Flight Attendant Uniform Appearance Standards: Your Image Is the United 
Brand, UNITED 20-21, https://unitedafa.org/docs/uniforms/appearance_standards.pdf (last visited Dec. 
18, 2017). 
 52. Maheshwari, supra note 43. 
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women, policies like these are an implied command to change their naturally kinky 
hair to something that is aligned with more traditionally approved hairstyles.53 An-
gela Onwuachi-Willig says in her essay Another Hair Piece: Exploring New 
Strands of Analysis Under Title VII, 
[a]s it is, the law is unfairly based upon an assumption that black women’s 
hair structure and texture are the same as those of white women or, worse, 
an assumption that it is reasonable for an employer to make implicit de-
mands on black women to relax or straighten their hair–in other words, to 
place requirements on black women to change the physical structure and 
texture of their hair.54 
Thus, it is implied when using a term like “conservatively styled”55 that a black 
woman’s kinky natural hair styled down (without any manipulation) would likely 
not fit into the narrowly categorized box of “conservative”56 due to its way of grow-
ing up and out, seemingly defying gravity.57 Black women are forced to change the 
structure and texture of their hair to fit in with approved grooming standards.58 
There are many other influences that give similar messages, leaving many 
black women feeling as though they need to hide their naturally kinky hair.59 Black 
women are encouraged through media imagery to alter their hair, and receive the 
message from hair company manufacturers that there is something wrong with the 
original texture of black hair, and it must be changed.60 
But altering the chemical structure of black hair to straighten it is harmful, 
chemical hair relaxer products, which permanently straighten curly hair have been 
linked to fibroids and hair breakage.61 Yet still, many black women feel compelled 
to chemically straighten their hair as black women spent 131.8 million on relaxers 
in 2014.62 As sociologist Ann DuCille points out, “[w]e have yet to see [a] Miss 
America or [a] Black Miss Universe with an Afro or cornrows or dreadlocks.”63 In 
the hit show Scandal, the main character Olivia Pope, a put-together lawyer played 
by Kerry Washington, typically wears her hair “perfectly coifed” and straight-
ened.64 Only when she is kidnapped and imprisoned is her large natural hair in full 
view, to seemingly reflect the reality that Olivia had become undone.65 Not only do 
                                                          
 53. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2, at 1131. 
 54. Id. 
 55. United Inflight Servs., supra note 51, at 20-21. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Ayana Byrd & Lori L. Tharps, When Black Hair Is Against the Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/opinion/when-black-hair-is-against-the-rules.html?_r=0>. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Cheryl Thompson, Black Women and Identity: What’s Hair Got to Do With It?, MICH. FEMINIST 
STUD., http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mfsfront;c=mfs;c=mfs-
front;idno=ark5583.0022.105;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mfsg (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
 60. Id. See also Nana Sidibe, This Hair Trend is Shaking Up the Beauty Biz, CNBC (July 1, 2015, 
2:45 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/01/african-americans-changing-hair-care-needs.html (noting 
that hair relaxer sales have been on the decline.) 
 61. Sidibe, supra note 60. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Thompson, supra note 59. 
 64. Clover Hope, Scandal: The Various Stages of Olivia Pope’s Prison Hair, JEZEBEL (Jan. 30, 2015, 
12:40 PM), http://themuse.jezebel.com/scandal-the-various-stages-of-olivia-popes-prison-hair-
1682770811. 
 65. Id. 
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black women receive explicit and implicit demands to change their hair from the 
media and product manufacturers, but from their work environments too.66 
D. Courts Are Limited in Their Understanding of Black Hair 
Black women are left with limited options in what constitutes a work appropri-
ate hairstyle. In Rogers v. American Airlines, the court speaks to afros and natural 
or ethnic hairstyles.67 Renee Rogers, a black American woman and flight attendant, 
sued her employer, American Airlines, for whom she worked 11 years, when it de-
manded that she not wear her hair in a cornrow style, and instead asked her to style 
her hair in a bun.68 American Airlines based its hair change requirement on its 
grooming policy.69 Renee’s argument was that the policy banning her from wearing 
braids at work was discriminatory based on race and sex.70 The trial court quickly 
dismissed Renee’s argument of sex discrimination because the grooming policy at 
issue applies to both men and women in that a man with longer hair would also not 
be permitted to wear an all-braided hairstyle.71 Additionally, Renee argued that the 
policy was discriminatory on the basis of race because cornrows have a special sig-
nificance for black American women because they have been “historically, a fash-
ion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of cultural, historical 
essence of the Black women in American society.”72 
However, the court rejected Renee’s argument.73 The court reasoned that Renee 
was not entitled to relief because the cornrow style was an “‘easily changed char-
acteristic,’ and even if socioculturally associated with a particular race or national-
ity, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the application of employment 
practices by an employer.”74 The court bolstered its conclusion by saying that 
American Airlines did not ask Renee to significantly change her hair, only suggest-
ing that she put it into a bun or place a hair piece around her ponytail,75 and re-
minded Renee that she is free to do what she wants on her own time with her hair.76 
The court’s suggestion that Renee can simply switch back and forth between 
cornrows and her natural hair between work shifts and after work hours sheds light 
on its lack of knowledge regarding black women’s hair.77 For example, individual 
braids that fully encompass a woman’s head can take more than eight hours to in-
stall, and almost as much time to remove.78 Thus, the court adding this caveat is 
                                                          
 66. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 67. Id. at 232. 
 68. Id. at 231. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 231-32. 
 74. Id. at 232. 
 75. Commonly available are “hairpieces” that act as a foe bun or ponytail to add volume or length. 
The hairpiece wraps around the natural hair and is tightening by a drawstring, or held in place by bobby 
pins. 
 76. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Taylor Bryant, What You Need to Know Before Getting Box Braids, REFINERY29 (Dec. 4, 2015, 
7:50 AM), http://www.refinery29.com/box-braids; see also Rochelle Connery, How to Remove Corn-
rows, LEAF TV, https://www.leaf.tv/articles/how-to-remove-cornrows/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
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revealing because it shows that judges may not have a basic understanding of what 
is required for black women to change their hair from one style to the next. 
Further, suggesting that it is a fair concession that American Airlines tell Renee 
to just put a fake hair piece over her own natural hair betrays a similar lack of un-
derstanding about the risks of using fake hair. The court’s reasoning implies that 
black women’s hair is not acceptable in its natural form.79 This is especially so given 
that it is very common for black women to get traction alopecia (permanent hair 
loss) that comes from years of using hair pieces for long periods of time.80 Traction 
alopecia is a medical hair loss condition that arises from the constant stress and 
tension that hair extensions, weaves, and chemical hair straightening can cause, all 
of which further proves the explicit and implicit requirements placed on black 
women’s hairstyling are not easy adjustments to accommodate.81 
Moreover, this speaks to a fundamental problem: it is more acceptable and dis-
plays more of a conservative and business-like image for a black woman to place a 
fake, white-looking hair piece over her natural hair, than it is for her to wear her 
hair naturally styled in a way that has a strong historical and cultural significance 
to her.82 Additionally, the court does not give much discussion to Renee’s argument 
(that cornrows and other braided hairstyles are historically and culturally signifi-
cant) when in fact black American women have been wearing these hairstyles for 
over 200 years, while white women have not.83 The result of Rogers is that compa-
nies can demand that an employee change her braids, cornrows, and dreadlocks in 
order to comply with grooming policies and terminate her with impunity if she does 
not.84 
The Rogers decision severely limits the hairstyles a black woman with natural, 
chemically unprocessed hair can wear. Under this decision, black women cannot 
wear braids or dreadlocks, and their natural hair, in many cases, will not conserva-
tively fit into a bun.85 As authors Byrd and Tharp put it in When Black Hair is 
Against the Rules, “because of the thickness of a lot of black women’s hair, a bun 
is not always possible unless the hair is put into twists first.”86 How then are black 
women to wear their hair? 
The Rogers court did concede that if the hairstyle at issue were an afro, there 
may have been a colorable race discrimination claim under Title VII because com-
panies would then be banning a natural hairstyle that does “implicate the policies 
underlying the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of immutable characteris-
tics.”87 But the afro introduces a different set of problems: many black women 
would not dare wear their hair in an afro within a corporate environment, especially 
a large afro because of the political and social messages that it sends to others, 
whether intended or not.88 Black women wearing cornrows and other ethnic 
                                                          
 79. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 233. 
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hairstyles are alternative options to what is sure to be discrimination, in many in-
stances, when worn in a large afro.89 
As a result of not having the freedom to wear a large afro or cornrows at work 
without facing discrimination, the 11th Circuit’s concession that banning afro’s 
might fit within the construct of Title VII is without much force, unless a woman is 
willing to wear an afro to work to be discriminated against just so that she can bring 
suit against her employer—an unappealing option.90 This is because the afro is com-
monly viewed as a symbol of black power and militancy.91 
In Hair It Is: Examining the Experiences of Black Women with Natural Hair, 
an article written on the problems black women face as a result of their natural hair, 
the authors say that just wearing an afro is a “political act within itself, since de-
pending on the environment[,] such hair may be deemed socially and politically 
unacceptable,” which stems back to the political activism of blacks in the 1970s, 
who wore their hair in natural afros to illustrate pride in the movement towards self-
acceptance.92 But many contemporary black American women have no intention of 
making a “radical” political statement just by wearing their hair naturally, as a re-
cent study of African American college women showed, “[black] women felt that 
going natural was a personal choice rather than a political statement or a rebellion 
against white beauty standards.”93 Thus, black women are left with either chemi-
cally relaxing their hair or getting hair extensions. 
Maintaining straightened chemically relaxed hair and or hair extensions is a 
very expensive and onerous process.94 The monetary costs of a chemical straight-
ener lie between $60 to $300 for each full treatment, and between $40 to $100 for 
a touch-up in between; the typical upkeep is a treatment about every four to eight 
weeks.95 
The time costs are also substantial. In order to maintain a straightened hair ap-
pearance, a black woman may spend two hours straightening on the first day, often 
with two to three hours of straightening every couple of days in between.96 As a 
result of all of the costs, time, and capriciousness of straightening kinky curly hair, 
a black woman cannot allow her hair to get wet, lest the curls spring back up.97 The 
result is a constant worry about humidity and rain, and swimming becomes out of 
the question.98 If the above was not life-altering enough, due to the fear of water or 
humidity affecting straightened hair, black women tend not to exercise because 
moisture reverts straightened hair back to its curly texture, which dramatically ef-
fects their health and well-being.99 In African American Women, Hair Care, and 
Barriers, the authors discuss the reality of this problem: 
                                                          
 89. See generally id. 
 90. Id. at 91 
 91. Id. at 90. 
 92. Id. 
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Focus group analysis of African American women who had struggled with 
weight loss and body weight maintenance, the issue of hairstyle manage-
ment was a major theme. Exercise avoidance was cited as a way to over-
come hairstyle challenges related to physical activity. In another study, 
many African American women reported that they felt that they had to 
make a conscious decision to sacrifice their hairstyle for the sake of phys-
ical activity . . . . A recently published survey study found that nearly 40 
[%] of African American women have avoided exercise secondary to hair 
care concerns.100 
This is not an issue of vanity. Black women are the most obese and overweight 
in the nation,101 and there is no vanity in following the ascribed standards of normed 
whiteness in order to retain employment.102 The implicit and explicit demands that 
black women change their natural hair leads black American women to think that 
their hair is not presentable in its “natural state” and leads to disparate impact dis-
crimination by placing an undue burden on black women to conform to white hair 
norms.103 Disparate impact is found when a person shows that a particular practice 
causes a disparate effect based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and 
the employer cannot show that there is a consistent business need for the practice at 
issue.104 
III.  SOLUTIONS TO THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RACE 
DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
Courts have continued to say that black women’s hair is not sufficiently tied to 
race.105 In the 11th Circuit, in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, Chastity 
Jones argued, inter alia, that it was discriminatory to deny her a job because she 
had dreadlocks, which were banned by CMS’ grooming policy.106 Chastity’s argu-
ment was that this constituted race-based discrimination under Title VII, saying that 
dreadlocks are a “natural outgrowth of the immutable trait of black hair texture; that 
the dreadlock[] hairstyle is directly associated with the immutable trait of race; that 
dreadlocks can be a symbolic expression of racial pride; and that targeting dread-
locks as a basis for employment can be a form of racial stereotyping.”107 The 11th 
Circuit dismissed Chasity’s argument, saying that race cannot be tied to character-
istic traits such as hair and thus, cannot be protected under Title VII.108 
In Rogers v. American Airlines, Renee Rogers argued that the right to wear a 
cornrow hairstyle should be protected and to ban this hairstyle is a form of race and 
sex discrimination under Title VII.109 Renee argued that cornrows and other braided 
hairstyles have a special significance to black American women, and have 
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historically been a part of the historical and cultural essence of black American 
women.110 The trial court was unresponsive to this argument and said that hair is a 
mutable characteristic and thus not protected from racial discrimination under Title 
VII.111 The court also said that an argument about sex discrimination under Title 
VII does not apply here because the grooming policy applies to both men and 
women.112 The court concluded that black women’s hairstyles do not fall under Title 
VII’s prohibitions against race or sex discrimination.113 
A. Immutability Should not be Applied as Only to “Accidents of 
Birth” 
The first part of the solution to this problem is that the courts’ definition of 
immutability with respect to black hair is outdated and must change. In Sharon 
Hoffman’s The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 
Hoffman argues that courts currently interpret immutability in ways that are hard to 
understand, and “no coherent theory can be developed to elucidate why some unal-
terable traits are awarded protection status by federal law and others are not.”114 
One common theory that underlies the current concept of how Title VII is applied 
is that it is based on traits that cannot be changed that are a result of “accidents of 
birth.”115 Accidents of birth—like race.116 But times are changing, and it is time to 
stop using such antiquated methods for determining immutability under Title VII. 
Other non-discrimination acts are applied far more broadly.117 The Fair Hous-
ing Act (“FHA”) protects against housing discrimination for “familial status.”118 
This allows for protection when a person is pregnant, has children, or adopts a child, 
none of which are immutable characteristics.119 Many states, including Missouri, 
protect against credit discrimination on the basis on marital status, which is also not 
an immutable characteristic.120 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(“GINA”) was passed in 2008, and prohibits employers from discriminating against 
employees with respect to genetic information.121 GINA is based on immutable 
characteristics, but very broadly applies to anyone’s DNA.122 
The American with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”) protects 
employees with disabilities from discrimination and includes protections for people 
with diabetes, which is not strictly an immutable characteristic.123 The Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) protects against age discrimination of 
those who are 40 years old or older (not an immutable characteristic), and the Equal 
                                                          
 110. Id. at 231-32. 
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Pay Act (“EPA”) protects both sexes from pay discrimination on the basis of sex.124 
Some of the above protected classes clearly involve immutable characteristics, but 
many of them do not, and are applied to large groups of the American population.125 
The ADAAA in fact says that the definition of disability should be interpreted 
as broadly as possible, and “to the maximum extent allowed by the relevant word-
ing.”126 This begs the question, why is Title VII’s “race” definition not interpreted 
to the maximum extent allowed by the wording—especially in light of our national 
history? If courts are reluctant to interpret immutability broadly because they are 
concerned with opening the flood gates—this did not stop these other Acts from 
being broadly applied, where large groups of Americans are protected from dis-
crimination for characteristics that are mutable. 
A new definition of protected immutable characteristics has been considered 
by scholars, one which defines immutability as a characteristic that is either “be-
yond the power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to [individual] 
identity or conscience” that it is effectively unalterable and “ought not be required 
to be changed.”127 In light of such Acts like the FHA, which have broad general 
interpretations and applications of protections for discrimination, is it not time that 
courts do the same in their interpretation of race and immutability under Title VII? 
B. Sexual Discrimination Under Title VII Should be Interpreted as 
Having a Disparate Impact on Black Women as a Result of 
Grooming Policies that Ban Ethnic Hairstyles 
The second solution to the problem of black women not having the ability to 
wear their hair in ethnic styles at work is for courts to interpret sexual discrimination 
under Title VII differently. Courts should begin to look at the result of not protecting 
black women’s hair under grooming policies as having a disparately discriminatory 
effect based on sex under Title VII. In Jesperson v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Dar-
lene Jesperson sued Harrah’s for sex discrimination based on the company’s groom-
ing policy that she alleged required much more onerous standards for women than 
men.128 In order to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title 
VII, a plaintiff must show that they were intentionally discriminated against, or 
show that the act at issue had a discriminatory effect.129 
Notably, the sexual discrimination standard is lower than what is required to 
show a prima facie case for race discrimination, where a plaintiff must show “(1) 
he [or she] belongs to a protected class; (2) he [or she] was qualified to do the job; 
(3) he [or she] was subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) his [or her] 
employer treated similarly situated employees outside his [or her] class more favor-
ably.”130 In the case at issue, Darlene argued that the grooming policy violated Title 
VII because it required women bartenders to wear makeup.131 The court held that 
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there was no sex discrimination because Harrah’s placed equal and opposite bur-
dens on men because men could not wear makeup and could not have their hair 
below their shoulders.132 Black women’s hairstyles can be distinguished from Jes-
person, because grooming policies that only affect black women have an actual un-
equal and disparate impact on them, this is because black women are much more 
likely to be affected by hair bans on braids and other ethnic hairstyles than white 
women.133 
Disparate impact is shown when “a specific employment practice produced an 
adverse effect on the basis of a protected status, such as race.”134 An adverse effect 
can be shown when courts are confident that the disparity affects the protected class 
at a level of 95%.135 Black women should be protected under Title VII sex discrim-
ination and be permitted to wear ethnic hairstyles because grooming policies that 
are facially neutral have a greater effect on black women, such that it is a legal 
fiction to argue that standards such as hairstyle requirements banning ethnic hair-
styles apply equally to all women in the same way. The result is that grooming 
policies that do not allow women to wear braids and dreadlocks force many black 
women to resort to hair extensions and wigs to maintain the neat and professional 
look many companies urge.136 
Within the 12 months preceding the survey’s date, 44% of black women have 
worn weaves, wigs or hair extensions, and 38% plan on getting either a weave, wig, 
or hair extensions within the next 12 months.137 The author of  A Comprehensive 
Guide for Hair Extensions for a White Girl says that hair extensions are “perfect for 
a wedding look,” suggesting that on the rare occasion when white women do wear 
extensions, it is for a special event, and not a daily requirement.138 There is a dis-
parate impact on black women because in order to comply with grooming standards, 
black women spend an inordinate amount of time, and money in order to maintain 
a more acceptable look, which white women in reality are not subjected to, even if 
the grooming policies are facially neutral.139 
C. National Origin Under Title VII Should be More Broadly Applied 
to Characteristics That are Perceived Ethnic Traits 
A third solution to the problem of black women’s ethnic hairstyles in the work-
place lies in a broader interpretation and application of national origin under Title 
VII.140 National origin, as outlined by the legislatures who passed Title VII, is de-
fined as the nation of a person’s birth or of their ancestor’s birth.141 Courts should 
expand their interpretation of national origin to include ethnic traits that are 
                                                          
 132. Id. at 1106. 
 133. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2, at 1090. 
 134. Id. at 1120. 
 135. Id. at 1120-21. 
 136. See generally id. 
 137. Natural Hair Movement Drives Sales Of Styling Products In US Black Haircare Market, MINTEL 
(Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/beauty-and-personal-care/natural-hair-movement-
drives-sales-of-styling-products-in-us-black-haircare-market. 
 138. Jenny, A Comprehensive Guide for Hair Extensions for White Girl, EVERAFTERGUIDE, 
http://www.everafterguide.com/hair-extensions-for-white-girl.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
 139. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 2, at 1123. 
 140. 2 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (1996). 
 141. Perea, supra note 19, at 807. 
14
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/9
No. 2] Henson; Are My Cornrows Unprofessional? 535 
intertwined with a particular ethnicity. The prohibition against discrimination based 
on national origin has been dominantly interpreted very narrowly by courts under 
Title VII and has therefore become ineffective as a tool against discrimination.142 
National origin protections under Title VII often do not cover discrimination based 
on race-related traits.143 For example, Title VII does not protect Mexican Americans 
from being called slurs like “wetbacks,” nor does it protect people speaking another 
language at work from discrimination.144 
Notably, some of what is protected under national origin under Title VII can 
actually be labeled as discrimination based on an employee’s perceived ethnic 
traits.145 Typically it is just not apparent to an employer what nation a person or 
their ancestors are from, but they discriminate just the same.146 Thus, some courts 
have held that national origin discrimination more commonly occurs based on per-
ceived ethnic markers such as: skin color, features, dress, food habits, and names.147 
In Janko v. Ill. State Toll Highway Authority, plaintiff Loretta Janko filed a 
claim of national origin discrimination under Title VII against her employer, claim-
ing she was discriminated against because she is a Gypsy.148 This case is notable 
because Gypsies are defined as not coming from any one particular country, but 
instead are known simply as an ethnic group of people who are not originally from 
America.149 The court held in Loretta’s favor, denying Defendant’s motion to dis-
miss, saying that national origin under Title VII was intended to help those who are 
discriminated against because of ethnic characteristics.150 Some courts have agreed 
with the reasoning in Janko, and have held that national origin protects against dis-
crimination for Serbians, Ukrainians, and Acadians, although these can be more 
appropriately described as ancestries, not places of national origin.151 Black Amer-
ican women’s ethnic hairstyles fall into the vein of ethnic characteristics or traits 
that have been the basis for discrimination, yet these hairstyles receive no protection 
because courts have more dominantly interpreted national origin under Title VII as 
narrowly as possible.152 
Janko v. Ill. State Toll Highway Authority, and the unusual ancestry protections 
listed are the  exceptions to how Title VII is generally interpreted, and several com-
mentators have said “the Supreme Court of the 1980s was almost never willing to 
interpret statutes to effectuate the rights of African Americans and other racial mi-
norities to be free of workplace discrimination when their interests were opposed 
by employer and union groups.”153 Instead of the majority of courts interpreting 
national origin by its plain meaning, courts should begin to explicitly and commonly 
recognize discrimination based on perceived ethnic traits, which would then be 
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analyzed as any prima facie case of national origin discrimination: by either proving 
direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.154 
A prima facie case of discrimination is shown by  “evidence, which if believed, 
proves [the] existence of [a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.”155 To 
prove national origin discrimination based on circumstantial evidence, there needs 
to be a showing that “(1) he [or she] is a member of a protected class; (2) he [or she] 
was qualified for the position; (3) he [or she] suffered an adverse employment ac-
tion; and (4) he [or she] was replaced by a person outside of his [or her] protected 
class or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside his 
[or her] protected class.”156 Once the showing is made, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer to show that there is a non-discriminatory reason for the action, then if suc-
cessful, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the given pretext is not 
the actual reason for the action.157 Using either of the two tests for a prima facie 
case of national origin discrimination would necessitate black American women 
showing statistical proof that they are more affected by grooming policy hair stand-
ards than any other group of people.158 Additionally, black women must show that 
this type of discrimination arises out of a perceived ethnic trait that arises from one 
ethnic group—African hair texture that leads to the ubiquity of ethnic hairstyles that 
are the least burdensome for them to wear; and an ethnic trait that is now a bedrock 
of the African American community because of the tradition of wearing ethnic hair-
styles for over 200 years.159 
An ethnic hairstyle is an obvious marker that a person belongs to a certain eth-
nic group where discrimination arises not so much from national origin itself, but 
rather “perceptible manifestation[s] of ethnic distinction, [and] ethnic traits.”160 If 
the courts wish to effectuate the protection of Title VII for a large group of those 
who are under its protection, it should broaden its interpretation and application of 
national origin to include black American women who face discrimination in their 
work environments due to ethnic hairstyles.161 
D. Courts Should Consider Stacking Race, Sex, and National Origin 
as Applied to Title VII and Grooming Polices 
In the alternative, courts should interpret the issue of black women wearing 
ethnic hairstyles in the workplace through the stacked lens and an expanded view 
of discrimination based on race, sex, and national origin under Title VII. The inter-
sectionality of overlapping traits that disadvantage some and lead to a lack of power 
in the workplace is a reality for many.162 According to Professor Kimberle 
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Crenshaw, “overlapping dynamics of class, race, and gender, among others, can 
create a specific vulnerability, insight, and social disenfranchisement based on sit-
uated identities and social locations, dependent on the interaction of each structural 
dynamic.”163 In Rogers v. American Airlines, Renee Rogers argued that her ethnic 
braids should be protected based on race and sex, but the courts did not find that 
persuasive.164 
National origin protection would give recognition to the nuanced and complex 
disadvantage that black American women face in their work environment for wear-
ing their hair in ethnic styles.165 History has shown that neither the protection based 
on the classification of race nor sex are successful on their own for protecting black 
women from employers who will not allow them to wear ethnic hairstyles; but if 
courts interpret immutability more broadly, consider sex as contributing to a dis-
parate impact on black women, and expand their interpretation of national origin to 
include ethnic traits, then black women could find a successful outcome. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Due to the unique texture of black women’s kinky hair, employers’ grooming 
policies that restrict black women from wearing braids, cornrows, and other ethnic 
hairstyles at work leads to an incredible burden on black women.166 Black women 
are faced with the temporal, financial, and life-limiting costs that result from groom-
ing policies that do not allow for styles that are the healthiest for black hair.167 Title 
VII is the main legal tool for pursuing discrimination claims, yet it is without teeth 
for black women who are fired because their hair does not fit within acceptable 
notions of professionalism.168 Black women have argued that they should not be 
discriminated against due to their ethnic hairstyles using a race-based discrimina-
tion theory alone, and a theory of race and sex based discrimination together, but 
they have not yet argued on the basis of an expanded interpretation of race, sex, and 
national origin-based discrimination—or, alternatively, stacking all three.169 
Race has been an unsuccessful category for protection of black women’s hair 
because courts have said that there are no protections for mutable characteristics 
like hair, but these interpretations should change to fit with current understandings 
of immutability.170 Courts should protect black women under sex discrimination 
under Title VII because when braids, cornrows, and other ethnic hairstyles are 
banned from the workplace, those bans disparately impact the black women who 
wear them—not all women.171 
Courts should expand their interpretation and application of national origin to 
protect black American women under Title VII because often discrimination occurs 
based on perceived ethnic traits and hairstyles that arise out of national origin, and 
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should be protected as such.172 And finally, in the alternative, courts should look at 
the unique intersectionality of race, sex, and national origin stacked together to un-
derstand the disadvantage and lack of privilege that black American women face in 
their employment environments due to their hair.173 Admittedly, the above argu-
ments ask much of the courts, but Title VII was intended to be a strong tool, as was 
said when courts first discussed the purpose of Title VII: “I do not emphasize the 
word ‘equality’ standing by itself . . . . It means equality of opportunity in the field 
of employment.”174 
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